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JURY INSTRUCTIONS, NOT PROBLEMATIC EXPERT
TESTIMONY, IN CHILD SEXUAL ASSAULT CASES
I. INTRODUCTION
Especially when dealing with the despicable and emotionally
charged crime of child sexual abuse, the courts must vigilantly balance the
state's interest in punishing a criminal wrongdoer against the defendant's
right to a fair and impartial trial.' The New Jersey Supreme Court observed that, "[slociety must tread a measured path that avoids ignoring the
reality of child sexual abuse and avoids as well the possibility of unjust
conviction of this most shameful of crimes."2 In child sexual abuse cases
the only witnesses are often the alleged victim and perpetrator, prosecutors
have therefore relied on behavioral
science to aid the jury in evaluating the
3
credibility.
victim's
alleged
Experts in the field claim that child victims of sexual assault typically exhibit certain behavioral patterns. ° These behavior characteristics
include sleeping disturbances, returning to the abuser if a family member

or friend, eating disorders, exhibiting inappropriate sexual behaviors, delaying disclosure and retraction, among others. Some argue that unless
specially trained, the average person can not "believe that a normal, truthful child would tolerate [abuse] without immediately reporting or that an
1 Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 868 (1990) (commenting on necessity of protecting innocent defendants from children's suggestibility). The American Academy of Pediatrics defines "sexual abuse" as "the engaging of a child in sexual activities that the child
cannot comprehend, for which the child is developmentally unprepared and cannot give
informed consent, and/or that violate the social and legal taboos of society.... sexual abuse
includes a range of activities from violent rape to a gentle seduction." DOUGLAS ABRAMS &
SARAH RAMSEY, CHILDREN AND THE LAW: DOCTRINE, POLICY AND PRACTICE 541 (West
Group 2000) (quoting American Acad. of Pediatrics, Guidelinesfor the Evaluation of Sex-

ual Abuse of Children, 87

PEDIATRICS

254 (1991)).

State v. J.Q., 617 A.2d 1196, 1211 (N.J. 1993) (commenting on the necessity of
protecting children while protecting the rights of the criminal defendant).
3 Elizabeth Trainor, Admissibility of Expert Testimony on Child Sexual Assault Accommodation Syndrome (CSAAS) in Criminal Case, 85 A.L.R. 5th 595, 608 (2001).
4 Roland C. Summit, The Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome, 7 CHILD
ABUSE & NEGLECT 177, 180-85 (1983). Girls are more likely than boys to be victims of
sexual assault; however, evidence shows that boys may be more reluctant to report abuse
than girls because they fear being perceived as homosexual. DOUGLAS ABRAMS & SARAH
RAMSEY, CHILDREN AND THE LAW: DOCTRINE, POLICY AND PRACTICE 338 (2000). Furthermore, men are more likely than women to be abusers. Id.
5 Id.
2
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apparently normal father could be capable of repeated, unchallenged sexual
molestation on his own daughter.",6 Expert opinions regarding a child's
behavior after sexual assault have generated controversy since a dramatic
rise in child sexual assault prosecutions in the late 1970s.7 Such expert
testimony should be used for the limited purpose of providing a context to
evaluate the credibility of a witness.' There is the risk, however, that the
jury may rely too heavily on the expert's testimony and allow the expert's
conclusions to overwhelm their own evaluation of the evidence. 9
Prosecutors argue that expert opinion testimony from social workers, psychologists and psychiatrists about typical behavior traits of sexually
abused children is necessary to educate the jury and to explain the possible
underlying reason(s) for the child's confusing behavior, behavior that the
layperson may conclude contradicts his/her testimony.'° However, defense
attorneys argue that this kind of testimony impermissibly bolsters the child
witness' testimony, invades the jury's fact finding function and, at worst,
comments directly on the guilt of the defendant."1
If expert testimony regarding behavioral characteristics of child
sexual assault victims is sufficiently reliable and admissible, then what is
the most effective manner of conveying this information to the jury? 12 One
id.
7 David McCord, Expert Psychological Testimony About Child Complainants in
Sexual Abuse Prosecutions: A Foray into the Admissibility of Novel Psychological Evidence, 77 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 5 (1986) (discussing general admissibly of behavioral science testimony in child sexual abuse prosecutions). The women's movement of the
1970's also helped raise awareness of child sexual abuse and the federal government responded to the problem by enacting the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act of
1974. DOUGLAS ABRAMS & SARAH RAMSEY, CHILDREN AND THE LAW: DOCTRINE, POLICY
6

AND PRACTICE 338 (2000).

8 Neil Vidmar & Regina Schuller, Juries and Expert Evidence: Social Framework
Testimony, LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1989, at 143.
9 Id.

10 Dara Loren Steele, Note, Expert Testimony: Seeking an Appropriate Admissibility
Standardfor Behavioral Science in Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, 48 DUKE L.J. 933,
940 (1999).
11 Glendening v. State, 536 So. 2d 212, 214 (Fla. 1988).
12 This note does not discuss the reliability or acceptance of such expert testimony
within the scientific community. For simplicity's sake, this note assumes that such testimony would pass any Duabert/Frye/Statetest for admission of scientific expert testimony.
See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (overruling the "general acceptance" test and delineating other requirements for admission of scientific evidence focusing
solely on principles of methodology); Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir.
1923) (stating that the subject of expert testimony must have gained "general acceptance" in
the particular field); See generally Diana Younts, Constitutional Perspectives: Evaluating
and Admitting Expert Opinion Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions,41 DuKE L.J.
691 (1991); Lisa Askowitz & Michael H. Graham, The Reliability of Expert Psychological
Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, 15 CARDozo L. REV. 2027 (1994). For
cases deciding whether expert testimony is admissible, see United States v. Bighead, 128
F.3d 1329, 1330 (9th Cir. 1997) (permitting expert testimony in child sexual assault case
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method is through the traditional use of expert testimony, however, problems persist with this approach despite awareness and cautioning by the
courts. 13 Expert opinion testimony, even by impartial non-percipient witnesses, often impermissibly treads on 14the jury's independent credibility
assessment of the complaining witness.
This Note first explains the relevant behavior patterns experts testify
about in child sexual assault cases and why this information is crucial to
the jury's understanding of the surrounding facts. It will examine past uses
of expert testimony and demonstrate that many states even permitted experts to comment directly on the credibility of the child. 15 Next, this Note
will discuss the current state of the law, followed by an illustration of the
persistent problems with allowing such testimony. Finally, this Note argues as an alterative, the use of jury instructions to impart the necessary
facts about behavior characteristics typical of sexually abused children
without commenting directly or indirectly on the credibility of the child
complainant. Although courts have not yet used jury instructions in child
sexual assault prosecutions, Massachusetts courts have similarly utilized
jury instructions rather than expert testimony regarding eyewitness testimony reliability. 16

without Daubert analysis); State v. Varela, 873 P.2d 657, 660 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993) (declining to apply Frye test to expert CSAAS testimony); Rolader v. State, 413 S.E.2d 752, 757
(Ga. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that testimony concerning CSAAS was scientifically reliable
and therefore admissible over defense objections). For cases determining that such expert
testimony is excluded because scientifically unreliable see Irving v. State, 705 So. 2d 1021,
1025 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (concluding expert's testimony would not pass the Frye
test); Mitchell v. Commonwealth, 777 S.W.2d 930, 932 (Ky. 1989) (ruling that behavior
characteristics of sexually abused children were not sufficiently accepted within the medical
community to be admitted into evidence and were irrelevant to the defendant's guilt or
innocence); State v. Bolin, 922 S.W.2d 870, 873-74 (Tenn. 1996) (concluding that expert
testimony regarding the behavior characteristics of sexually abused children was not sufficiently reliable to assist a jury and was inadmissible).
13 Commonwealth v. Richardson, 667 N.E.2d 257, 261 (Mass. 1996) (noting testimony is more likely to be proper when the expert makes no connection between generalized
expert testimony and the complainant child).
14 Commonwealth v. lanello, 515 N.E.2d 1181, 1184-85 (Mass. 1987)
(commenting
on the difficulty of discerning the line between permissible expert testimony and impermissibly invading the fact finding province of the jury).
15 See generally State v. Kim, 645 P.2d 1330 (Haw. 1982) (permitting expert to
vouch for the credibility of the child witness), overruled by State v. Batangan, 799 P.2d 48
(Haw. 1990) (holding expert testimony on the witness' credibility unduly prejudices the
defendant and should be limited to only explaining whether behavior is consistent or inconsistent).
16 Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 391 N.E.2d 889, 892-93, 897-98 (Mass. 1979) (permitting defendant who fairly raises the issue of mistaken identification to request specialized jury instructions); Commonwealth v. Santoli, 680 N.E.2d 1116, 1121 (Mass. 1997)
(revising Rodriguez instructions).
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II. TYPICAL EXPERT TESTIMONY IN CHILD SEXUAL ASSAULT
CASES
A. Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome (CSAAS)
Child psychologist Dr. Roland Summit first identified Child Sexual
Abuse Accommodation Syndrome (CSAAS) in his 1983 journal article for
Child Abuse and Neglect.17 According to Dr. Summit, child victims of
sexual abuse exhibit a similar set of behaviors and identifiable emotions
that allow them to "accommodate" the abuse into their everyday life.' 8
The first symptom of CSAAS, secrecy, arises from the private nature of the
abuse and often the molester's admonishments not to report the abuse.' 9
Helplessness, Dr. Summit's second identified behavior pattern, results
from the inherent power imbalance between the abuser and the child.2 °
Typically, the abuser is in a position of authority in relation to the child
(parent, caretaker, religious authority) and can easily take advantage of
society's norm that children should obey adults. 2' Because of the secrecy
and helplessness felt by the victim entrapment is often the third identified
behavior. In other words, the child feels he/she will not be believed if
he/she comes forward and the child feels powerless to stop the abuse.22
The first three behavioral characteristics displayed by an abused child contribute to Dr. Summit's fourth and fifth elements of CSAAS.2 3 Children
often wait months or years to disclose the abuse and then often recant their
stories, claiming to have lied under pressure from family or well intentioned investigators. 24 CSAAS also identifies other, more concrete behaviors typically demonstrated by sexually abused children such as changes in
weight, appetite, scholastic performance, and depression or insomnia. 25
17 Summit, supra note 4 at 180.

"I Id. at 184. Dr. Summit defines "accommodation" as the child learning to accept
the situation and survive. Id. "The healthy, normal, emotionally resilient child will learn to
accommodate to the reality of continuing sexual abuse." Id.
19 Id. at 181. "The secrecy is both the source of fear and the promise of safety: 'Everything will be alright if you just don't tell."' Id.
20 Id. Dr. Summit comments, "the adult expectation of child self-protection and
immediate disclosure ignores the basic subordination and helplessness of children within
authoritarian relationships." Id. at 182.
21

id.

22 Id. at 184. "If the child did not seek or did not receive immediate protective inter-

vention, there is no further option to stop the abuse.. .there is no way out, no place to run."
Id.
23 Id. at 186. Dr. Summit, relying on outside sources states that most ongoing sexual
abuse is never disclosed. Id. However, if sexual abuse is disclosed, "the child of any age

faces an unbelieving audience when she complains of ongoing sexual abuse." Id. Retraction occurs because the child is likely to be filled with guilt over the abuse and the "martyred obligation to preserve the family". Id. at 188.
24

id.

25

Id.
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Despite the term "syndrome," CSAAS is not a diagnostic tool that
can be used to prove that sexual abuse did in fact occur.26 Rather, it is intended for clinicians to use therapeutically, proceeding from the premise
that abuse did take place, identifying common reactions to child sexual
abuse and to help the child heal.2' Dr. Summit himself intended that
CSAAS be used only as, "a 'common language' for the professionals
working to protect sexually abused children. 2 8
B. Child Sexual Assault Syndrome (CSAS)
Although many child sexual assault experts cite Dr. Summit's
CSAAS specifically when testifying in court, many expert witnesses generally refer to Child Sexual Abuse Syndrome (CSAS). 29 CSAS is not attributable to a single scientific study or journal article, but rather the accumulation of individual expert's observations, experiences and general30 theoretical knowledge of behavioral patterns of sexually abused children.
A court permitting CSAS testimony may allow experts to testify
that in their professional experience a victim of childhood sexual abuse
may exhibit certain predictable but seemingly illogical behaviors. 31 These
behaviors may be similar to those noted under CSAAS (changes in mood,
sleeping patterns, and depression), but may also include behaviors that are
not in Summit's theory such as preoccupation with sexual behaviors, masturbation, developmental regression and misbehavior.32
26 See generally John E. B. Meyers et al., Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse
Litigation, 68 NEB. L. REV. 1, 67 (1989) (emphasizing the need for professionals to use the
same terminology when discussing the effects of child sexual abuse).
27 See Rosemary L. Flint, Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome: Admissibility Requirements, 23 AM. J. CRIM. L. 171, 177 (1995); See Roland C. Summit, Abuse of the
Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome, 1 J. CtILD SEXUAL ABUSE 153, 155 (1992).
28 Meyers et. al. at 67. Dr. Summit also warned of the danger inherent in using
CSAAS as a diagnostic tool in the courtroom. See generally Dirk Lorenzen, Special Topics
in the Law of Evidence: The Admissibility of Expert Psychological Testimony in Cases
Involving Sexual Misuse of a Child, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1033, 1048 (1988) (discussing the
non-diagnostic nature of CSAAS and emphasizing the need to assume that the behavior
patterns are "both meaningful and consistent" with sexual abuse).
29 See Steele, supra note 10, at 940 (discussing the generalized nature of expert testimony regarding childhood sexual abuse syndrome).
30 See Lorenzen, supra note 28, at 1050 (noting CSAS is, "an amalgam of the personal experience of a given expert combined with what the expert knows of empirical studies and explanatory theories). See also Steward v. State, 652 N.E.2d at 499 (deciding to
permit all expert testimony regarding behavior patterns associated with childhood sexual
assault, regardless of the syndrome's terminology).
31Commonwealth v. Dunkle, 602 A.2d 830, 832 (Pa. 1992) (allowing testimony
concerning CSAAS and CSAS to be treated synonymously); see also Steward, 652 N.E.2d
at 499 (Ind. 1995) (permitting all expert testimony regarding behavior patterns associated
with childhood sexual assault).
32 See Lorenzen, supra note 28, at 1050 (discussing the numerous behavioral characteristics associated with CSAS); see also Lisa R Askowitz & Michael H. Graham, The
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As with CSAAS, CSAS is not a diagnostic tool. 33 There is no scientifically accepted manner of proving34that sexual abuse occurred based on
an alleged victim's behavioral pattern.
C. Post Traumatic Stress Disorder(PTSD)
In addition to CSAAS and CSAS, post traumatic stress disorder
(PTSD) is another syndrome about which experts often testify in sexual
abuse cases. 3 Under a PTSD theory, the child's abnormal behavior is attributable to a trigger: either a single traumatic event (a rape) or a series of
equally stressful events (continued molestation). Therapists and other psychology experts may describe the child's behaviors and compare them to
the standardized elements of PTSD.36 However, unlike CAAS and CSAS,
PTSD does not demonstrate any particular indicia of sexual abuse, such as
recanting allegations, and does not place any emphasis on sexually abnormal behavior.37
To effectively use PTSD at trial, a prosecutor must first suggest to
the jury that the presence of certain behavior leads to a positive diagnosis
of PTSD. The expert would then testify that past sexual abuse triggered
Reliability of Expert Psychological Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, 15
CARDOZO L. REV. 2027, n.223 (citing the AMA Diagnostic and Treatment Guidelines Concerning Child Abuse and Neglect). The following behaviors are indicative of child abuse:
highly sexualized play, withdrawal, excessive daydreaming, low self-esteem, feelings of
guilt, falling grades, pseudo-mature personality development, sexual promiscuity, poor peer
relationships, suicide attempts, frightened or phobic behavior towards adults. Id.
33 id.

34 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 2027, n. 55 (discussing the diagnostic nature of Battered
Child Syndrome). Like CSAAS, CSAS is not an acceptable diagnostic tool. Id. However,
confusion in the court system may have arisen because another syndrome, Battered Child's
Syndrome (BCS), is a generally accepted basis for inferring that a child was a victim of
abuse by his caretaker. Id. Generally, BCS testimony establishes a reasonable inference
that a child with multiple, severe, and persistent injuries were not caused by accidental
means, but rather inflicted by an individual with ongoing contact with the child. Deborah S.
v. Superior Ct., 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 858, 860 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996). "The [BCS] diagnosis is
dependent on inferences, not a matter of common knowledge, but within the area of expertise of physicians ... expert testimony ... has been held admissible and is not an invasion of

the jury's domain, even though by this diagnosis the physician draws an inference of nonaccidental injury." Id. See also People v. Jackson, 95 Cal. Rptr. 919, 921 (Cal. Ct. App.
1971) (allowing expert testimony to conclude that in his expert opinion, a child's injuries
were caused by a pattern of abuse by his caretaker). See generally C. Henry Kempe et al.,
The Battered Child Syndrome, 181 J. OF THE AM. MED. Ass'N. 17 (1962) (describing characteristics of the injuries and diagnostic features).
35 See, e.g., Hall v. State, 670 A.2d 962, 967 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996) (allowing
expert to testify that PTSD symptoms are "consistent with" sexual abuse); State v. White,
943 P.2d 544 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997) (holding evidence of PTSD was valid and probative of
sexual abuse); State v. Henry, 495 S.E.2d 463, 469 (S.C. Ct. App. 1997) (permitting PTSD
diagnosis).
36 See Steele, supra note 10, at 944.
31 Id. at 948.
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(or could have triggered) the PTSD. However, as defense counsel should
respond, PTSD can be caused by any stressful event in the child's life, not
necessarily by sexual abuse.38
D.General Terminology

Despite the common labels (CSAAS, CSAS and PTSD) therapists
and other mental health professionals use to categorize particular and general behavioral traits of sexually abused children, courts often allow expert
testimony about "syndrome" behavior without requiring any specific terminology. 3
III. RELEVANT BEHAVIOR PATTERNS: WHY ARE THEY
IMPORTANT?
Prosecuting a child sexual assault case is extremely difficult. First,
these cases usually lack concrete physical or medical evidence that is common in most trials. Second, there are generally no corroborating witnesses
because of the inherently private nature of child sexual abuse. n0 Ultimately, these cases simply turn on credibility: the child's testimony versus
the defendant's denials. 4' Even more difficult for prosecutors are the prob38

See Askowitz & Graham, supra note 32, at 2048 (discussing the questionable

causal connection between the child's behaviors that led to a PTSD diagnosis and the
trauma of sexual abuse); see also David Faust & Jay Ziskin, Challenging Post-Traumatic
Stress Disorder Claims, 38 DEF. L.J. 407, 413 (1989) (stating that many "normal" people
experience symptoms associated with PTSD and emphasizing that any stressful event such
as illness or divorce can cause PTSD symptoms). For cases allowing PTSD testimony in
child sexual assault cases see generally: People v. Fasy, 829 P.2d 1314 (Colo. 1992); People v. Roy 558 N.E.2d 1208 (I11.App. Ct. 1990); State v. Edward Charles L., 398 S.E.2d
123 (W.Va. 1990). For cases not allowing PTSD testimony in child sexual assault cases see
generally: Nelson v. State, 782 P.2d 290 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989); State v. Gokey, 574 A.2d
766 (Vt. 1990); State v. Jensen, 415 N.W.2d 913 (Wis. 1988).
39 Commonwealth v. Dockham, 542 N.E.2d 591, 594 (Mass. 1989) (allowing testimony regarding typical behaviors of victims of child sexual abuse); People v. Bibbs, 2004
LEXIS 3140 No. 248374, 2004 Mich. App. Lexis 3140, 3144 (Mich. Ct. App. Nov. 16,
2004) (declining to reverse conviction holding expert testimony regarding typical behaviors
non prejudicial); Mary Ann Mason, A Judicial Dilemma: Expert Witness Testimony in
Child Sex Abuse Cases, 19 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 185, 189 (1991) (citing over 130 cases
which describe typical behavioral characteristics of children known to have been sexually
abused, without specifically naming any particular syndrome or behavior pattern).
40 See Askowitz & Graham supra note 12, at 2033-33 (discussing the private nature
of sexual assault cases).
41 See Steele, supra note 10, at 938 (opining that in the "he said, she said" contest,
"combined with the 'beyond the reasonable doubt' standard, the child-victim and her story
are likely to lose [the] contest."); see also Veronica Serrato, Expert Testimony in Child
Sexual Abuse Prosecutions:A Spectrum of Uses, 68 B.U. L. REV. 155, 158 (noting the
difficulty of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that sexual abuse occurred through only a
child's testimony).
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lems inherent in any child witness.42 Children do not make convincing
witnesses because they often give inconsistent recollections of timing and
events. 43 Children also become easily nervous or embarrassed and are often reluctant to testify; all of these factors can further undermine their
credibility with the jury. 44
Given the pivotal nature of the child's testimony in these cases, the
prosecutor must educate the jury regarding the child's actions leading up to
the trial.45 It is important that the jury understand that the child's potentially inconsistent behaviors during and after the abuse should not undermine the child's credibility as a complaining witness.4 6
For example, in a case where a child remained with his abuser for
years without reporting the abuse and later recants his allegations, a prosecutor should make the jury aware that such actions do not necessarily impeach the child's credibility. 47 Expert testimony regarding behaviors typically demonstrated by sexually abused children could help the jury more
accurately assess the child's credibility. a8 But, what should be the preferred method to convey this essential information to the jury? And to
what extent should courts/judges allow experts to testify in this regard?
Prosecutors may use syndrome and similar evidence in one of three
ways in child sexual assault cases. 4 9 First, prosecutors may use syndrome

42

Id. (noting a child's developmental and psychological concerns when children

testify in front of a jury, especially concerning sexual abuse he/she suffered).
43 See Steele, supra note 10 at 940. See generally Serrato, supra note 41, at 159
(discussing a child witness' reluctance to testify, her inability or unwillingness to give
graphic, detailed reports, and her vulnerability during cross-examination in child sexual
assault cases).
44 id.
45 See Askowitz, supra note 12, at 2037 (discussing the pivotal nature of such testi-

mony). See also Serrato, supra note 41, at 159. A jury may find "the delayed, inconsistent
or unconvincing disclosures or recantation as evidence of fabrication, especially if defense
counsel suggests this conclusion on cross-examination of the child victim or in argument."
Id.
46 See Flint, supra note 27 at 935 (demonstrating the difference testimony by an expert can have on the jury's interpretation of the child's behavior); See generally People v.
Beckley, 456 N.W.2d 391, 393-94 (Mich. 1990) (allowing a social worker to educate the
jury regarding a typical victim's delayed disclosure and recantation of allegations of incest).
47 id.
48 See Flint supra note 27, at 180 (discussing that a typical juror may not understand
why the child delayed in disclosing the alleged abuse and that delayed disclosure may lead
to diminished credibility of the child witness).
49 See Trainor, supra note 3 at * 15 (categorizing the uses for expert testimony regarding CSAAS). See also Serrato, supra note 41, at 165 (charting a spectrum of uses for expert
testimony into six categories in ascending order of impact on the defendant's guilt or innocence). The six categories in ascending order are: (1) refutation of defense counsel's
claims, (2) common characteristics of sexually abused children, (3) veracity of particular
child witness, (4) matching general characteristics of sexually abused children with particular child-witness, (5) common characteristics of sexual abusers, (6) expert testimony on the
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evidence to explain behavioral traits of abused children, to generally educate the jury. 50 Second they may use expert opinion testimony to rehabilitate the child's credibility after an attack during cross-examination or after
the child has shown inconsistent behaviors. 51 Finally, a prosecutor may
use syndrome evidence preemptively to bolster the child's credibility before any cross-examination attack on his/her credibility by allowing an
expert witness to testify that in his/her 52professional opinion he/she believes
the child's allegations of sexual abuse.
IV. CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW
A. Prohibitionon all Expert Testimony
Some states take the drastic approach of prohibiting all expert testimony regarding the common behavioral characteristics of sexually

abused children. 53 These courts are concerned that the expert will impermissibly comment on the credibility of the child victim even with curative
jury instructions.54 However, the jury needs to be educated impartially
abuser's identity, (7) general veracity of children alleging sexual abuse. Id. This note focuses on the most commonly used and often appealed three areas for expert testimony.
50 Id.
51
52

id.
Id.

53 Commonwealth v. Garcia, 588 A.2d 951, 958 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991), appealdenied,
604 A.2d 248 (Pa. 1992) (holding that expert's testimony served to bolster the credibility of
the victims); Commonwealth v. Dunkle, 561 A.2d 5, 10 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, 602 A.2d 830 (Pa. 1992) (holding the effects of child sexual assault were
within the common knowledge of a layperson). In Dunkle, the court reasoned expert testimony impermissibly infringed on the role of the jury to determine the credibility of the
witness. Id. See also, Patricia A. Korey, Rehabilitative Expert Testimony in Child Sexual
Assault Cases: the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania Shuts the Door on Effective Prosecutions, 66 TEMP. L. REV. 589, 595 (1993). Pennsylvania courts do, however, permit expert
testimony regarding the existence or lack of physical evidence in child sexual assault cases.
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 690 A.2d 274, 276-77 (Pa. 1997). Florida is another state that
does not permit expert testimony in child sexual assault prosecutions, but over concerns of
scientific reliability. Hadden v. State, 690 So.2d 573, 574-75 (Fla. 1997) (stating "syndrome testimony" may not be admitted in criminal prosecutions for child abuse and reaffirming the use of the Frye test as the standard for all syndrome evidence). See also Michael D. Stanger, Is the FloridaSupreme Court up to the Task of Being America's Criminal
Evidence Court? Throwing the Baby Out with the Bathwater: Why Child Sexual Abuse
Accommodation Syndrome Should be Allowed as a Rehabilitative Tool in the Florida
Courts, 55 U. MIAMI L. REV. 561, 563-564 (2001) (criticizing Florida's exclusion of all
syndrome evidence related to sexual abuse).
54 Commonwealth v. Seese, 517 A.2d 920, 922 (Pa. 1986) (excluding expert testimony because it invaded the province of the jury). "Such testimony admitted as evidence,
would encourage jurors to shift their focus from determining the credibility of the particular
witness who testified at trial, allowing them instead to defer to the so-called "expert" assessment of the truthfulness of the class of people of which the particular witness is a member. Id.
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about the common and often contradictory behavior of child victims of
sexual assault in order to independently evaluate the credibility of the child
witness' accusations.5 5 Without this important knowledge base, juries may
unfairly judge children's behavior by adult standards and find their testimony not credible because of previous inconsistent actions.56
B. Direct Bolstering of the Complainant'sCredibility
The Federal Rules of Evidence and most state rules generally prohibit a witness from commenting on the guilt or innocence of a defendant.57 However, when child sexual abuse cases were on the rise in the late
1970s and early 1980s, experts were often allowed to testify that they either believed the allegations of the child or that, in their professional opinion, sexual abuse in fact took place.58
For example, in State v. Kim59 the Supreme Court of Hawaii carved
out an exception to the general rule that one witness can not testify about
the credibility of another witness.6° In Kim, after the defense attorney impeached the child's credibility, the court permitted a child psychiatrist to
testify that in his professional opinion he believed the child's accusations. 6 '
The expert testified that he examined the child and she exhibited several
symptoms common to victims of sexual assault and expressed a belief in
her allegations. 62 The court held that child abuse was outside the common
experience of a jury and therefore, "an expert's assessment of credibility
may arguably provide the jury with useful information.' 63 The court further reasoned that the doctor's testimony was admissible because:
The preservation of the jury's factfinding functions have represented a continuing concern of the law of evidence. Previously this province has been preserved by limiting expert testimony to matters of such a character that only persons of
skill, education, or experience in it are capable of forming a
correct judgment as to any facts connected therewith and
forbidding expert opinion testimony on ultimate issues to be
55 See generally Steele supra note 10 (discussing the need for expert testimony in

child sexual assault cases).
56 Id.
57 FED. R. EvID. 704.
58 See Kim, 645 P.2d at 1330 (permitting testimony from psychiatrist regarding
credibility of child complaint). See also supra note 6, regarding rise of child sexual abuse
prosecutions in the 1970s.
59 645 P.2d 1330 (Haw. 1982).
60 Id. at 1337.
61

Id. at 1334-35.

62

Id. at 1333. The doctor testified that the thirteen year-old exhibited a fear of future

sexual abuse, depression and a negative attitude towards sex in general. Id.
63 Id. at 1337.
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decided by the jury. The modem trend however has been to
abandon these somewhat unwieldy limitations in favor of
more liberalized constructs which permit the trial court to
balance the probable probative value of proffered expert testimony against any deleterious effect and preclude such testimony as it will not assist the jury. 64
The court stated that the underlying purpose of the testimony was
not to substitute the expert's evaluation of the complainant's testimony for
that of the jury, but to give the jury perspective, "according to which it can
evaluate the complainant's testimony for itself., 65
However, State v. Bantagan66 overruled Kim two years later. In
Bantagan, an expert testified after examining the child complainant that, in
his professional opinion, he believed the child's allegations. 67 Although
the expert never specifically stated that the child was "truthful" or "untruthful" in her allegations, the jury was likely left with the impression that
the expert believed the child's accusations. 68 The Bantagan court overruled the rule set forth in Kim, stating that although it recognizes the difficulty of child sexual abuse prosecutions, the defendant should not be
prejudiced by an expert witness commenting on the credibility of another
witness. 69 Like most jurisdictions today, the Bantagan court held that experts, "may
not give opinions which in effect usurp the basic function of
70
the jury."

Today, courts generally prohibit explicit testimony regarding the
credibility of the child witness.7' Blatantly vouching for the credibility of
64

Id. at 603-04.

65 645 P.2d at 605.
66 799 P.2d 48 (Haw. 1990).
67
68
69

Id. at 50.
Id. at 54.

70

Id.

Id.

71 See State v. Foret, 628 So. 2d 1116, 1122 (La. 1993) (reversing a conviction
for

sexual abuse when the prosecution expert commented directly on the particular victim's
credibility). In Foret the court's holding was based on the fact that the expert did not limit
his testimony to general characteristics of sexually abused children. See also Commonwealth. v. LaCaprucia, 671 N.E.2d 984 (Mass. 1996) (reversing a conviction because of
improper linking between the characteristics of sexually abused children and the complainant). But see Rojas, 868 P.2d at 1037 (deciding to no longer permit an expert to comment
on the credibility of a complaining witness). However, the court did decide to permit generalized testimony regarding CSAAS to assist the trier of the fact in forming his/her own
opinion regarding the witness' credibility. Id. See generally Commonwealth. v. Allen, 40
Mass. App. Ct. 458 (1996) (refusing to allow defense expert to comment on the videotape
in question reasoning that such opinions would comment on the child's credibility); Commonwealth v. Allen, 40 Mass. App. Ct. 458 (1996) (deciding the trial judge correctly refused to allow defense expert to comment on the videotape in question as such opinions
would have commented on the child's credibility). However, there are some jurisdictions
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one witness through another expert witness is particularly dangerous.72
The jury will likely believe that the expert has superior knowledge and
may substitute their assessment of the complainant's credibility for that of
the expert.73

C. Rehabilitation
Courts often permit expert testimony regarding the child victims'
behavior only after the defense attacks the child's truthfulness by suggesting the child's bizarre behavior is evidence that the allegations are false.74

Courts permit such expert testimony to rehabilitate the witness only after
the defense suggested that the allegations were fabricated based on the
child's seemingly inconsistent behavior. The expert must then limit his/her

that permit experts to testify directly that sexual abuse occurred. Townsend v. State, 734
P.2d 705, 707-08 (Nev. 1987) (allowing expert to express an opinion about whether or not
the child had been sexually abused). The court did find that the expert's testimony that the
defendant was the perpetrator was improper. Id. See also Lickey v. State, 827 P.2d 824,
827 (Nev. 1992) (permitting expert to testify that victim had post-traumatic stress disorder
secondary to sexual abuse). South Dakota also generally allows direct testimony regarding
the particular victim. State v. Floody, 481 N.W.2d 242, 244 (S.D. 1992) (stating South
Dakota's rule regarding expert testimony); State v. Bachman, 446 N.W.2d 271, 275 (S.D.
1989) (permitting expert to testify that he believed the child was telling the truth).
The trial court did not err in admitting expert testimony concerning the traits and
characteristics typically found in sexually abused children, characteristics or emotional conditions observed in the victims, and opinion testimony that the victim's
allegations were truthful. Id. at 276.
See also, McCafferty v. Solem, 449 N.W.2d 590, 592 (S.D. 1989) (allowing an expert to
testify as to certain characteristics of sexually abused children and compare those characteristics to the particular victim). However, the general rule is that "one witness may not testify as to another witness' credibility or truth-telling capacity because such testimony would
invade the exclusive province of the jury to determine the credibility of a witness." Id. See
also Trainor, supra note 3, at *2b.
72

Id.

73 Id.

74 See People v. Peterson, 537 N.W.2d 857, 860 (Mich. 1995) (permitting expert
testimony about general sexual assault syndromes after the defendant attacks the credibility
of the alleged sexual abuse victim). See also United States v. Bighead, 128 F.3d 1329,
1334 (9"t Cir. 1997) (recounting trial where expert testified in a general nature about delayed disclosure and inconsistencies in an alleged victim's story after the victim's ability to
recall the abuse had been challenged on cross-examination). Here, the expert was called as
a rebuttal witness and did not testify as to the facts of the particular case, but rather about
"delayed disclosure" and memory problems associated with childhood sexual assault. Id.
People v. Nelson, 561 N.E.2d 439, 442 (Ill. 1990) (allowing expert CSAAS testimony on
rebuttal only). The court held that in the "middle position" of absolute rejection and absolute acceptance to the point of vouching for the credibility of the victim, the trier of the fact
would be, "informed of the general characteristics exhibited by victims of child abuse,
which are often inexplicable or conflicting, but at the same time would not invade the province of the same trier of fact in weighing on the credibility of the evidence." 85 A.L.R. *5.
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testimony to his/her opinion that the child's behavior is "consistent
with"
75
or commonly demonstrated by victims of child sexual abuse.
Other courts such as in People v. Patino,76 allow the use of expert
testimony in the prosecution's case-in-chief, even before the crossexamination of the child witness, to explain why he/she did not immediately report the abuse.77 The court found that, "the testimony was pertinent
and was admissible as an issue had been raised with regard to the victim's
credibility., 78 The court emphasized, however, that the trial judge gave the
jury specific instructions that the expert's testimony was not admissible as
substantive evidence of the defendant's guilt, but rather used to rehabilitate
her credibility and behavior that the defense had questioned.79 Even when
used to rehabilitate witness' credibility in the minds of the jury, expert
testimony may be seen as usurping the factfinding function of the jury.8 °
D.Educate Generally
Most often, prosecutors use expert testimony in child sexual assault
cases to educate the jury about behavioral characteristics of sexually
75 Peterson, 537 N.W.2d at 860.
76

32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 345 (Ct. App. 1994).

77 Id. at 348-49. See also Peterson, 537 N.W.2d at 868-69. An expert may not testify

that abuse occurred and may not vouch for the veracity of the victim. Id. However, he may
testify in the case in chief regarding typical symptoms for the sole purpose of explaining a
victim's specific behavior that may be interpreted incorrectly and may testify w/regard to
the consistencies between the behavior of the particular victim and other victims of sexual
abuse to rebut an attack on the victim's credibility. Id.
78 Patino, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 348-49.
79 Id. at 350. The judge's instructions to the jury are as follows:
A witness has given testimony relating to the child sexual abuse accommodation
syndrome. This evidence is not received and must not be considered by you as
proof that the alleged victim's molestation claim is true. Child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome research is based upon an approach that is completely
different from that which you must take to this case. The syndrome research begins with the assumption that a molestation has occurred, and seeks to describe
and explain common reactions of children to that experience. As distinguished
from that research approach, you are to presume the defendant innocent. The
People have the burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, you
may consider the evidence concerning the syndrome and its effect only for the
limited purpose of showing, if it does, that the alleged victim's reactions, as demonstrated by the evidence, are not inconsistent with her having been molested.
Id.

80 See generally State v. Floody, 481 N.W.2d 242 (S.D. 1992) (permitting CSAAS

rehabilitation testimony with some exceptions). The court noted that as a general rule the
witness may not testify as to the credibility of another witness because such testimony
would invade the exclusive province of the jury to evaluate witness testimony. Id. However, it is interesting to note that this court allows the testimony of the expert to directly
compare the behaviors of the particular child complainant with characteristics of other
abused children. Id.
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abused children in the prosecution's case-in-chief. 8' The theory is that
jurors need the education to fairly evaluate the child's credibility because
abused children may behave in ways that are inconsistent
with the average
82
juror's expectation for a sexual assault victim.
Most courts caution that the expert testimony should be carefully
elicited so that the expert does not testify directly as to the credibility of the
complaining witness. 83 Massachusetts courts prohibit the expert from directly or implicitly linking observations of the child to behaviors or syndromes associated with sexual abuse.84 The courts are concerned that the
expert witness or treating therapist would impermissibly vouch for the
complainant's credibility, a function that is exclusively reserved for the
jury." Other jurisdictions such as Georgia and Florida allow the expert to
testify that the child suffers from symptoms "consistent" with those displayed by victims of sexual assault so long as the expert does
not explicitly
86
state an opinion on the credibility of the child complainant.
V. PROBLEMS WITH EXPERT TESTIMONY STANDARDS
Although there are few scientific studies analyzing the effect of expert testimony on jury deliberations, some evidence suggests expert testi81 See Trainor, supra note 3 at *3. Kansas courts allow such expert testimony to
comment on the common patterns of behavior exhibited by sexually abused children. State
v. Reser, 767 P.2d 1277, 1283 (Kan. 1989). Michigan courts permit experts to offer their
opinion to provide the jury with a "background" in order to assess the credibility of the
complaining witness. People v. Beckley, 456 N.W.2d 391, 393 (Mich. 1990). Oregon and
Arizona courts have also concluded that expert testimony helps the jury asses the credibility
of the complaining witness. State v. Lindsey, 720 P.2d 73, 74 (Arz. 1986); State v. Middleton, 657 P.2d. 1215, 1217 (1983).
82 Rojas, 868 P.2d at 1037 (permitting expert testimony to aid the triers of the fact to
understand the evidence and the typical behavior of sexually abused children). The court
also commented that the expert was allowed to "help" the jury evaluate the victim's credibility, but may not substitute his own opinion for that of the jury's. Id.
83 Commonwealth v. Colon, 729 N.E. 2d 315, 317 (Mass. App. Ct. 2000) (reasoning
expert opinion on signs of child abuse is permissible so long as it is not presented in manner
that offers an opinion on the complainant's credibility).
84 Commonwealth v. Dockham, 542 N.E. 2d 591, 598 (Mass 1989) (concluding that it
is within the judge's discretion to allow expert testimony on the general behavioral characteristics of sexually abused children to aid the jury in determining the credibility of the
complainant). However, the court stated that the expert may not comment on the experience of the actual child witness. Id. See also Commonwealth v. Broulliard, 665 N.E.2d
113, 115 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996) (holding that the complainant's treating doctor linked the
child complainant's behavior with the behaviors typically exhibited by victims of sexual
abuse, thereby indicating he believed the child's allegations and usurping the jury's duty to
evaluate the evidence presented); Commonwealth v. Richardson, 667 N.E. 2d 257, 263
(Mass. 1996).
85 id.

86 Cooper v. State, 408 S.E.2d 797, 800 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991); Calloway v. State, 520
So. 2d 665, 667 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
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mony makes the jury more likely to believe the alleged child victim than
without such expert testimony." Despite judges' attempts to limit the use
of expert testimony to impartial education, the use of non-percipient expert
witnesses often impermissibly treads on the jury's duty to independently
asses the credibility of the child. 88 Courts often find it difficult, if not impossible, to differentiate between "educating" expert testimony and expert
testimony that vouches for the credibility of the child witness. 9 One trial
court warned that, "an expert's opinion ...carries the danger of unduly
influencing the triers of fact [and] even objective opinions of experts regarding a victim's credibility is no more reliable than the determination of
the victim's credibility by the triers of fact." 90
Massachusetts, for example, recognizes the difficulty in striking the
proper balance between impartial education and impermissible commentary on the witness' credibility. 9 1 The state courts have set forth seemingly
clear standards for admissibility of expert opinion testimony in child sexual
assault prosecutions. 92 The prosecution may offer expert opinion testimony relating to the "general" behavior characteristics of sexually abused
children so long as the expert does not "link" his general testimony to the

87 Neil Vidmar and Regina A. Schuller, Juries and Expert Evidence: Social Framework Testimony, 52 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 133, 164-167 (1989). See generally Dione
Enea, Comment: Justice for Our Children: New Jersey Addresses Evidentiarv Problems
Inherent in Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 24 SETON HALL. L. REV. 2030, 2047-50 (1994).
88 Zabel v. Wyoming, 765 P.2d 357, 361 (Wyo. 1988), quoting State v. Kennedy, 375
S.E.2d 359, 367 (N.C. 1987).
We realize that in many instances, testimony of this nature will have the incidental effect of supporting or bolstering the credibility of the witness. Nevertheless,
the effect alone need not render the testimony inadmissible, as most testimony
expert or otherwise, tends to support the credibility of some witness. Id.
See generally Rebecca Roe, Symposium on Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions: The Current
State of the Art: Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 97,
109 (1985) (discussing dangers inherent in expert testimony regarding syndrome evidence).
89 State v. Haslam, Jr., 663 A.2d 902, 910 (R.I. 1995) (prohibiting expert testimony
that did not comment directly on another witness but had "the same substantive import" as
direct testimony regarding the credibility of the complainant).
" 799 P.2d 48, 51 (Haw. 1990). See generally Mary Hutton, Child Sexual Abuse
Cases: Reestablishingthe Balance within the Adversarial System, 20 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM.
491, 541 (1978) (noting the problems inherent in expert testimony particularly by treating
both therapists and experts).
91 Commonwealth v. Deloney, 794 N.E.2d 613, 618 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003) (commenting on the difficulty of defining permissible expert testimony and impermissible expert
vouching). See also Richardson, 667 N.E.2d at 262 (noting that the line between permissible and impermissible opinion testimony in child sexual abuse cases is not easily drawn).
92 See Dockham, 542 N.E.2d at 595 (permitting the judge to use his discretion to
allow expert testimony on the general behavioral characteristics of abused children).
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experience of the child.93 The courts, however, continue to struggle to
define what constitutes proper linkage and impermissible vouching.94
Additionally, courts inconsistently apply the rule for prosecution
and defense expert witnesses. In a 2003 case heard by the Massachusetts
Court of Appeals, the prosecution's expert witness testified about the, "delayed disclosure syndrome" common among victims of child sexual
abuse.95 The prosecution offered testimony the court found was necessary
to educate the jury that victims of sexual abuse often act in seemingly illogical manners. 96 However, the defense was not permitted to call an expert witness to testify that, "children enmeshed in serious family turmoil
often fabricate allegations of this nature."97
The Appeals Court held that the prosecution's witness did not
comment directly on the credibility of the witness, but rather provided the
jury with information that they could include in their evaluation of the witness' credibility. The court reasoned that the prosecution's witness simply
informed, "the jury that the victim's failure to disclose in a timely fashion
93 Commonwealth v. Trowbridge, 647 N.E.2d 413, 415-416 (Mass. 1995) (permitting
testimony that does not link the specific child witness and the expert's general behavioral
testimony); Commonwealth v. Hudson, 631 N.E.2d 50 (Mass. 1994) (finding that expert
testimony did not endorse the credibility of the victim and was properly admissible to explain aspects of the victim's behavior); Commonwealth v. Montanino, 567 N.E.2d 1212,
1215 (Mass. 1991) (concluding the hypothetical questions too closely mirrored the specific
child witness although there was no explicit linking of the opinion and the child witness);
see also Colon, 729 N.E.2d at 318 (holding that an indirect linkage was impermissible if the
opinion would inevitably be applied to the specific child alleging sexual abuse).
94 Deloney, 794 N.E.2d at 618 (noting the difficulty distinguishing between permissible expert testimony and expert testimony that "coaches" what to believe).
We understand that the jury's fact-finding role is jeopardized where the expert's
description of typical characteristics matches the characteristics of the specific
victims upon whom the jury's attention is focused. But if there is not at least some
relationship between the general characteristics and the actual case being tried,
then there is presumably no justification for the admission of the "general expert
testimony in the first place. So the question remains how to distinguish in a given
case between that expert testimony that fulfills a legitimate educational function
helpful to the fact finder, and that expert testimony that unlawfully coaches the
fact finder whether to accept or reject the testimony of particular witnesses.
Id. at 621.
95 Commonwealth v. Bougas, 795 N.E.2d 1230, 1234 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003).
96 Id. at 1236. See also lanello, 515 N.E.2d at 1184 (upholding exclusion of defense
expert witness). The court excluded a witness whose proffered testimony would conclude a
child whose parents were locked in a dispute was more likely to lie than a child whose
family was not in turmoil. Id. Although the testimony would not have rendered an opinion
on the credibility of the specific child, that would be the practical result. Id. The court
reasoned, "it would be unrealistic to allow this type of expert testimony and then expect the
jurors to ignore it when evaluating the credibility of the complaining child.. .If the testimony had been erroneously allowed [the expert] would have impermissibly intruded on the
vital function of the jury." Id.
97 Bougas, 795 N.E.2d at 1236.
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does not necessarily exonerate the defendant without suggesting that the
particular child witness in the case was or was not abused." 98 In holding
that the defense witness would have commented directly on the credibility
of the child witness, the court reasoned that the expert's testimony would
have, "brand[ed] the class of which the alleged victim is a member as untrustworthy, and directly encourage[ed] the jury to disbelieve the specific
child witness." 99
The Appeals Court's reasoning in Bougas is ultimately unpersuasive. The Bougas court chose to conclude that the defense expert's proffered testimony would have impliedly included the witness in a group of
individuals known to fabricate allegations."0° The same reasoning, however, can be used to find general testimony about behavioral characteristics
of sexually abused children impermissible. 10 ' Such testimony would align
the child witness with other children who are known to have been
abused.' °2 One could also argue that, if a jury should be educated about the
typical behavioral characteristics of a sexually abused child, the jury
should also be educated about situations in a child's life that may give rise
to the possibility of false allegations. 0 3 In this case, the defense expert's
proffered testimony would not have commented on the credibility of the
child witness any more directly than the prosecution's expert witness.' °4
Therefore,
the court should have allowed the defendant's witness to tes05
tify.1
VI. CONCLUSION -- USE OF JURY INSTRUCTIONS

Jury instructions relayed by the judge instead of expert testimony
would avoid the myriad of problems caused by expert testimony in child
sexual assault prosecutions. 0 6 Massachusetts favors this method, regularly
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 See supra note 53 and 54 and accompanying text.

Pennsylvania has used this

reasoning to prohibit all expert testimony on the general actions of children after being
sexually abused. Seese, 517 A.2d at 922 (excluding expert testimony because it invaded the
province of the jury).
102 Id.

103 The jury should be educated about this possibility assuming the social science
relied upon by the expert is sufficiently reliable to pass the threshold Daubert-type inquiry
by the trial judge.
104 id.
105 id.

106 Laurens Walker, Social Frameworks: A New Use of Social Science in Law, 73 VA.
L. REV. 559, 592-98 (1987) (discussing the effect of both jury instructions after expert
testimony and "pattern" jury instructions in place of expert testimony). See also Neil Vidmar & Regina A. Schuller, Juries and Expert Evidence: Social Framework Testimony, 52
Law & CONTEMP. PROBS. at 164-167 (suggesting that expert testimony has more of a prejudicial effect on jury deliberations than judicial instructions).
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employing jury instructions rather than expert testimony regarding the reliability of eyewitness testimony. 0 7 Such jury instructions educate the jury
18
about scientifically accepted factors that affect eyewitness reliability. M
An impartial judge could better educate the jury about common behavioral

patterns displayed by victims of sexual assault than an expert witness who
potentially invades the factfinding/credibility province of the jury. No
state employs jury instructions rather than expert testimony for child sexual
assault cases, so we analogize Massachusetts' experience with jury instructions regarding eyewitness reliability to the potential use of jury instructions rather than expert testimony in child abuse prosecutions.
There is a significant body of research dealing with the general reliability of eyewitness testimony and eyewitness identification, particularly
with the difficulty of cross-racial identification. ° But because of concerns
regarding the potential prejudicial effect of expert testimony, Massachu107

Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 391 N.E.2d 889, 892-893 (Mass. 1979) (setting out

model jury instructions regarding factors of reliability of eyewitness testimony). See also
Santoli, 680 N.E.2d at 1120 (revising Rodriguez instructions). See generally Commonwealth v. Francis 453 N.E.2d 1204, 1206 (Mass. 1983) (listing factors for eyewitness identification). 1-2 Mass. Jury Instructions Criminal Form 2-11 Identification Evidence.
One of the most important issues in this case is the identification of the defendant
as the perpetrator of the crime. The Commonwealth has the burden of proving
identify, beyond a reasonable doubt. It is not essential that a witness himself be
free from doubt as to the correctness of [his] [her] statement. However, you, the
jury, must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the accuracy of the identification of the defendant before you may convict him. If you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was the person who committed the
crime, you must find the defendant not guilty... In appraising the identification
testimony of a witness you should consider the following... Id.
See also 1-2 Mass Jury Instructions Criminal Form 2-12 Identification Evidence (Crossracial Identification).
In this case, the defendant is of a different race than the race of the witness who
has identified [him] [her]. You may consider this fact and whether identification
of the defendant by a person of a different race from [his] [her] race may be less
reliable than identification by a person of the same race as [his] [hers].
Id.

108

id.

'(9 See generally Jeremy C. Bucci, Revisiting Expert Testimony on the Reliability of
Eyewitness Identification: A Call for a Determination of Whether it Offers Common
Knowledge, 7 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & App. ADVOC. 1 (2002); Thomas Dillickrath, Expert Testimony on Eyewitness Identification: Admissibility and Alternatives, 55 U. MIAMI L. REV.
1059 (discussing the general admissibility of expert testimony on eyewitness identification);
Cindy J. O'Hagan, When Seeing Is Not Believing: The Case for Eyewitness Identification
Testimony, 81 GEO. L.J. 741, 760-61 (1993); See generally John C. Brigham & Robert K.
Bothwell, The Ability of Prospective Jurors to Estimate the Accuracy of Eyewitness Identifications, 7 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 319 (1983). "Psychologists have devoted more scholar
effort to the examination of factors influencing eyewitness identification than to any other
area of law." Neil Vidmar & Regina A. Schuller, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 133, 159.
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setts generally employs jury instructions rather than expert testimony to
educate the jury about this accepted research and makes modifications as
the circumstances of the case warrant.''
Massachusetts courts are concerned that expert testimony could potentially unduly credit/discredit the
identifying witness' testimony, invade the common knowledge of the jury
or lead to unnecessary confusion."' One state court commented that:
Experts testifying on the reliability of eyewitness identification may appear to be intruding into an area traditionally and
exclusively the function of the jury. We look to the jury after
an adversary trial to make the decision as to what testimony
to believe. We permit, indeed require, the judge to instruct
the jury concerning factors that bear on the reliability of
eyewitness identification.. .The jury have the opportunity to
assess the witnesses' credibility on the basis of what is presented at trial and not solely on general principles." 12
Massachusetts courts do not categorically exclude the possibility of
expert identification testimony, but only permit such testimony at the discretion of the trial judge in exceptional
circumstances where jury instruc3
tions are deemed insufficient." 1
110 Commonwealth v. Payton, 623 N.E.2d 1127, 1134 (Mass. 1993) (allowing the trial

judge to modify instructions as the circumstances of the case warrant); See also Commonwealth v. Hyatt, 647 N.E.2d 1168, 1171 (Mass. 1995) (explaining that the inclusion of cross
racial factors in identifying a person of a different race is up to the discretion of the trial
judge); Commonwealth v. Engram, 686 N.E.2d 1080, 1084 (Mass. App. Ct. 1997) (concluding that it was not error for the trial judge to refuse to give cross-racial identification
instruction given the circumstances of the identification).
111 Payton, 623 N.E.2d at 1135.
"The inclusion of expert testimony does seem to
alter decision making process. The testimony tends to discredit eyewitness evidence and to
render verdicts more favorable to the defendant ... some studies suggest that social framework evidence is likely to have more impact on jurors when it is presented through expert
testimony rather than judicial instructions." Id. Neil Vidmar & Regina A. Schuller, LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 133, 165.
112 Francis,453 N.E.2d at 1221.
'13 Commonwealth v. Sowers, 446 N.E.2d 51, 53 (Mass. 1983); Santoli, 680 N.E.2d
at
1118 (cautioning that expert testimony only be admitted when it would not confuse or
prejudice the jury). Federal courts also generally uphold the discretion of the trial judge to
permit or exclude expert testimony on the issue of eyewitness identification, stating that a
trial judge could reasonably conclude in his discretion that expert testimony would not be
likely to add to common understanding of the issue of identification. See United States v.
Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 641 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982); Davis v.
United States, 439 U.S. 1132 (1979); United States v. Brown, 540 F.2d 1048, 1053-54 (10th
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1100 (1977); United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225
(1975); United States v. Fosher, 590 F.2d 381, 382-84 (1st Cir. 1979); United States v.
Watson, 587 F.2d 365, 368-69 (7th Cir. 1978); United States v. Collins, 395 F. Supp. 629
(M.D. Pa. 1975); United States v. Brown, 501 F.2d 146, 150-51 (9th Cir. 1974); United
States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1152-53 (9th Cir. 1973).
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As discussed above, courts continue to address the risk of improper
vouching by expert witnesses in child sexual assault cases with limited
success."14 Other states should follow Massachusetts' experience with
eyewitness testimony and similarly substitute jury instructions for expert
testimony." 5 Jury instructions are less invasive than expert testimony on
the jury's evaluation of witness' credibility." 16 A respected judge imparting jury instructions about behaviors exhibited by child survivors of sexual
assault would educate jurors without the danger of commenting on the
credibility of the child witness. The neutrally educated jury would then be
capable of independently evaluating the child's credibility and impartially
deciding the defendant's guilt or innocence.

MarinaMoriarty

114

See supra notes 14 and 15 discussing the various approaches courts have taken to

the use of expert testimony in child sexual assault cases.
115 See supra note 104 discussing Massachusetts' use of jury instructions rather than
expert testimony regarding eyewitness reliability.
16 See supra note 9 discussing the impact of expert testimony on jury deliberations.

